WILFREDO TORRES Y SUMULONG, petitioner,
vs.
HON. NEPTALI A. GONZALES, THE CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE, and THE DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF PRISONS, respondents.
FACTS:
This is an original petition for habeas corpus filed on behalf of the petitioner presently confined at the National Penitentiary inMuntinlupa.
Sometime before 1979, petitioner was convicted of 2 counts of the crime of estafa. He was sentenced to an eleven-year prison term.
A conditional pardon was granted to the petitioner by the President on the condition that he would “not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines” . Should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law. Petitioner accepted and was released from confinement.
However, in 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole recommended to the President the cancellation of the conditional pardon of the petitioner for having been charged with 20 counts of estafa pending trial. He was also convicted of the crime of sedition pending an appeal. NBI also reported a long list of charges brought against the petitioner including estaga, swindling, grave threats, grave threats, grave coercion, illegal possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives, malicious mischief, violation of Batas PambansaBlg. 22, and violation of Presidential Decree No. 772 (interfering with police functions). Some of these charges were Identified in the NBI report as having been dismissed.
The President cancelled the conditional pardon. Petitioner was arrested and confined to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence.However, he claims that he did not violate his conditional pardon since he has not been convicted by final judgment of the twenty (20) counts of estafa.
ISSUE:
Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before the petitioner can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence
RULING:
No, final judgment is not necessary.
In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options:
(i) to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code (EXECUTIVE ACT = not subject to judicial scrutiny)
or
(ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code which imposes the penalty of prisioncorreccional, minimum period, upon a convict who "having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon." (JUDICIAL ACT= consists of trial for and conviction of violation of conditional pardon)
Here, the President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the President's executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.
Note:
The Court also held that Article 159 and Section 64 (i) could stand together and that the proceeding under one provision did not necessarily preclude action under the other.
